Operation Epic Fury enters its sixth week, bumping up against two self-imposed public deadlines repeated by the Trump Administration: an approximate 4-to-6-week military operation and the President’s revised deadline to Iran of 8:00 p.m. tomorrow evening.
In addition to the President’s Easter Sunday Truth Social post updating the deadline to Iran, the weekend was dominated by coverage of the loss of a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle and A-10 Warthog over Iran and the successful resulting search and rescue mission.
As we enter the war’s potentially penultimate week, markets have inverted the trading arbitrage between the global Brent benchmark and WTI. Brent closed below WTI at the end of last week for the first time, a structural change that brings new risks to the domestic politics of rising gas prices and a challenging midterm election cycle for congressional Republicans.
On the trade front, the Administration marked the one-year anniversary of “Liberation Day” last week with a simultaneous three-action tariff salvo: a tiered steel and aluminum regime; a 100% pharmaceutical tariff; and a U.S.-U.K. pharmaceutical pricing arrangement.
USMCA talks continue somewhat uneventfully but with a new wrinkle as Alberta separatists claimed enough signatures to force an October referendum. And finally, the “Donroe Doctrine” advanced with significant developments out of Venezuela—the formal reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas and early signs of investor movement into the previously closed Latin American natural resources stronghold.
GEOPOLITICAL UPDATE
War Progression
Last week opened with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reporting that President Trump had told aides he was willing to end the military campaign against Iran even if the Strait of Hormuz remained largely closed. The logic: a Hormuz reopening mission would push the conflict past the promised 4-to-6-week timeline.
Falling short of securing the Strait, the revised plan asserts the successful destruction of Iran’s navy and missile stocks as cause for winding down the hostilities while continuing to pressure Tehran diplomatically. In the meantime, the burden of reopening the Strait falls on Gulf and European allies. As told by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Strait “will reopen one way or another — either Iran agrees to abide by international law or a coalition of nations will make sure it’s open.”
The counterevidence to an early exit arrived shortly after the WSJ’s reporting landed, with the President telling CBS he was “not actually stepping back from the war quite yet.” Last Thursday, President Trump doubled down on Truth Social, writing that the U.S. was making plans to target Iranian energy infrastructure, including “all desalinization plants” if a diplomatic deal was not reached “shortly.”
Yesterday, President Trump escalated further, posting: “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell — JUST WATCH!” Iranian military spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfaghari responded today warning that such an attack would be met with “much more crushingly and extensively” retaliatory operations.
Tomorrow’s new deadline and the U.S. attack on Iran’s Bileghan “B1” Bridge, bring a new sense of urgency to diplomatic negotiations as the week begins. Trump told Axios over the weekend that Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, were holding intense “text message” negotiations with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi through Pakistani, Egyptian, and Turkish mediators. The New York Post also reported that in addition to Araghchi, talks are taking place with Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, a former IRGC commander who previously said publicly that Iranian forces were “waiting for the arrival of American troops on the ground to set them on fire.”
Despite early reports today of a potential 45-day ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, Iranian state television reported today that the regime had officially rejected the offer and was instead calling for a permanent end to the war along with various other demands including “guarantees that we won’t be attacked again,” per negotiator Mojtaba Ferdousi Pour. President Trump responded by calling the purported Pakistani ceasefire proposal “not good enough, but it’s a very significant step.”
Three factors are weighing on the President as the clock ticks closer to tomorrow’s deadline: a growing sense of frustration with Iran’s slow-walking, questions over Iran’s negotiating structure, and Israeli/Saudi hardline postures. According to the President, “negotiations are going well, but you never get to the finish line with the Iranians.” The U.S. strike against the B1 bridge was a direct sign of the President’s growing impatience. According to Trump, Iran had requested five more days before agreeing to meet, leading him to conclude that they “were not being serious.”
Saudi officials remain steadfast in their position that Iran’s ballistic missile program and proxy networks be eliminated as preconditions to an agreement. In addition to Arab allies pressuring the President to force Iranian submission through military might rather than diplomacy, the success of the U.S.-Israeli military operations complicates Tehran’s ability to make durable decisions. The New York Times reported that the success of the U.S.-Israeli decapitation of Iranian leadership has created a leadership vacuum, hobbling Tehran’s ability to make diplomatic and military decisions—a double-edged reality that explains Iran’s contradictory public posture and private engagement. Undeterred, Israeli forces took out yet another top Iranian official overnight, IRGC intelligence head Majid Khademi.
Thus, diplomatic outreach and retaliatory military targeting continue. The latter was accentuated by multiple Iranian strikes over the last few days, beginning with an attack on Kuwait’s Al-Salmi supertanker carrying two million barrels off Dubai. Iran also broadened the scope of its targeting—as previously warned—to Gulf and Western economic assets including metals factories, tourist sites, and banking offices. Goldman Sachs’ Paris offices were placed under police surveillance last Wednesday after bomb threats were linked to the Iranian-connected proxy HAYI. French authorities also foiled a bomb attack targeting Bank of America’s Paris offices. The escalating threats to economic assets led Citigroup to move staff in Paris and Frankfurt to remote work.
The most significant kinetic development of the week came on Friday when an F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran, the first confirmed loss of a U.S. fighter to enemy fire since the 2003 Iraq invasion. Iran’s IRGC published photos of the wreckage and posted a reward for civilians to locate the crew.
U.S. forces immediately launched a combat search-and-rescue operation inside Iranian territory. While the pilot was recovered within hours, the weapons systems officer spent over a day relying on survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training in the mountainous terrain of southwestern Iran. President Trump announced that the officer had been extracted on Saturday by U.S. special forces assisted by heavy air cover.
Separately, an A-10 Warthog was hit by Iranian fire while participating in the rescue effort. The aircraft managed to reach Kuwaiti airspace before the pilot safely ejected. Two HH-60 rescue helicopters also sustained damage from Iranian small arms fire during the F-15E search-and-rescue but landed safely.
The dual rescue operations carry operational significance for both sides: Iran retains sufficient air defense capability to down a front-line U.S. fighter, but the U.S. demonstrated its ability to conduct multiple clandestine insertion operations inside Iranian territory with air cover and force protection. The latter directly informs the ground force discussion around seizing Kharg Island, the Hormuz islands, and Iran’s enriched uranium.
In the middle of the ongoing active combat operations, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth forced the retirement of U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Randy George. The proximate cause, per The New York Times, was a clash over the promotions of four Army officers. George, a Biden nominee, was removed alongside two other senior Army officers: General David Hodne, head of Army Transformation and Training Command, and Major General William Green, the Army’s chief of chaplains. General Christopher LaNeve, a former Hegseth military aide, was named acting Army chief.
The media coverage draws a parallel to Donald Rumsfeld’s sidelining of General Eric Shinseki after disagreements over Iraq invasion troop-level deployments. Despite the press hyperbole, however, it remains to be seen whether these internal staffing changes will have any effects on the Pentagon’s war-planning. For now, the Department of War shows no signs of decreased capabilities.
Eurozone Fracture
As the U.S.-Israel-Arab alliance hardens, the U.S.-NATO-Eurozone fracture continues to widen following Italy’s first-mover intransigence. Media reports last week included France declining to allow U.S. aircraft to use its airspace and Poland dismissing U.S. requests to relocate its Patriot batteries to the Middle East.
More than 40 U.S. allies met virtually on Thursday—in an effort convened by the UK—and began work on a “Plan B” for eventually securing the Strait of Hormuz. The reported plan involves a combination of diplomatic outreach to Tehran, potential sanctions, and military planning for a post-combat de-mining and policing operation. Military planners from the coalition are scheduled to meet this week, but there is little appetite among participants to use force to reopen the shipping channel while hostilities are ongoing.
Thus, the allied Plan B arrangement has no actual bearing on relieving the immediate shipping chokepoint. Rather, it is a peace-time structure for managing the Strait in a more durable fashion once the Iranian threat has been contained by others.
Oil Shock
The structural inversion of WTI closing above Brent at the end of last week has analysts pointing to WTI as the new vehicle for traders to price the prospect of a prolonged U.S. military campaign. Brent—as a global benchmark—is now acting as the more responsive trade for a diplomatic solution. As result, WTI surged more than 12% on Thursday, its highest level since June of 2022. The gap has somewhat closed during today’s trading but WTI remains more than $2 above Brent.
Meanwhile, Oman’s Foreign Ministry is in direct talks with Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, meeting over the weekend to draft a joint monitoring protocol whereby Oman would oversee maritime traffic through the Strait. The new protocol, combined with Iran’s nascent tolling system, demonstrates two competing transit architectures and the results are unfolding in real-time. A new southern route controlled by Oman led to the passage of three Omani vessels around Iranian waters. Meanwhile, the established northern route is still controlled by Iran and subject to a toll of up to $2 million per voyage, though Iraq appears to be enjoying a “special exemption.”
The above is having the first material impact on relieving Gulf shipping pressure, leading to four million barrels of crude transiting the Strait last Friday and pushing overall traffic to its highest level since the outbreak of the war. Notably, two Qatari LNG tankers are currently heading toward the Strait and a French ship successfully transited the lane last week, the first known Western vessel to make it through since the war’s outset.
Economic Outlook
Last week’s economic data show a U.S. labor market holding firm, but forward-looking indicators are flashing caution. The economic question has thus shifted from whether the war will inflict damage to a question of how far the damage will reach. The WSJ framed it succinctly: if the war ends in weeks, falling gas prices will deliver an economic tailwind. But if the economic stress is prolonged (months), recession risk rises materially.
On the tailwind side, the WSJ highlights a number of sectors that are seeing gains, including American fertilizer producers, defense companies, LNG producers, the U.S. dollar, and corporate merger activity. Mergers reached a record $1.3 trillion in Q1, showing an uptick in M&A activity that was sidelined during the Biden Administration and now undeterred by the war’s uncertainty.
The durability extends to the U.S. labor market which continues to absorb the war’s shock and serves as a positive domestic signal. Initial jobless claims for the week ending March 28 fell 9,000 to 202,000, well below the 212,000 consensus and near a two-year low. The March BLS jobs report, released Friday, showed nonfarm payrolls adding 178,000, well above the Dow Jones consensus of 59,000 and the strongest since year-end 2024, pushing bond yields higher.
Health care drove the bulk of the March gains at 76,000. Construction added 26,000 jobs; transportation and warehousing 21,000; and manufacturing 15,000. The internals were softer, however, as average hourly earnings rose just 0.2% for the month and 3.5% year-over-year. The unemployment rate edged down to 4.3% partly on a labor force contraction rather than net job gains. Discouraged workers rose 144,000 to 510,000 and the headline revised February’s report to -133,000 decline (originally reported as -92,000). March’s report is positive news, but uncertainty abounds and April’s read (due May 8) will be the first genuine post-war labor market print.
Survey data demonstrates the disparate impacts and resulting views. Conference Board Consumer Confidence for March came in at 91.8, edging up 0.8 points from February’s 91.0 and beating the Bloomberg consensus of 87.9. The Present Situation Index rose 4.6 points to 123.3; the Expectations Index slipped 1.7 points to 70.9, remaining well below the 80 threshold historically associated with pre-recession conditions. The Conference Board’s chief economist noted that write-in responses “spiked” on oil, gas, war, and conflict, the first clean read showing the war displacing tariffs as the primary consumer concern.
JOLTS for February showed job openings falling 4.9% to 6.882 million, below the estimate of 6.918 million. Total hiring fell 9.3% to 4.849 million, the lowest since April 2020. The quits rate dropped to 1.9%, its eighth consecutive month at or below 2.0%, reflecting a workforce unwilling to take chances. The low-hire, low-fire dynamic was firmly intact going into the conflict. Indeed Hiring Lab’s summary: “stuck in neutral.”
Case-Shiller for January showed the national home price index up just 0.9% annually, the weakest start to a year since the early 2010s. The 20-City Composite rose 1.2% year-over-year, the weakest since July 2023. Thus, the brief affordability reprieve from lower mortgage rates early in the year has been erased and the 30-year rose to 6.38%, its fourth consecutive weekly increase.
On the headwind side, the oil shock continues to weigh heavy. Though the U.S. entered the conflict as a major oil producer and provided North America with a cushion against shortages, American consumers have not been insulated from retail price increases. To be sure, Europe and Asia will continue to bear the most acute disruptions (with more to come), but the U.S. West Coast is heavily exposed to the global oil market. Downstream, helium supply disruptions from Iranian and Qatari fields are threatening semiconductor fabrication timelines and the AI buildout, while Europe is diverting diesel cargoes and unwinding supply chains.
Federal Reserve Board Chair Jay Powell, speaking to an economics class at Harvard last Monday, said the Fed’s policy “works with long and variable lags” which results in an ability to look-through current inflationary pressure and take a “wait and see approach.” In other words, by the time Fed policy takes effect, the oil price shock is probably “long gone.”
Markets, of course, reacted favorably to Powell’s long-view remarks, reading them as a signal against near-term rate hikes. But Kansas City Fed President Jeff Schmid separately warned against a look-through approach, stating that inflation “has been too high for too long” and “now is not the time to assume that inflation from higher oil prices will be transitory.”
Against this internal policy dilemma facing the Board, the Senate Banking Committee has scheduled an April 16 confirmation hearing for Fed Chair nominee Kevin Warsh. Powell’s term expires May 15, compressing the timeline for the Senate’s confirmation process. More importantly, Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) will continue to block the Warsh nomination until the DOJ concludes its Powell investigation. Tillis’s objection would result in a deadlock at Senate Banking, preventing Warsh from moving to the floor. Coincidentally, the Warsh hearing will land the same week as the March import price index release (April 15), which will be the first inflation reading to capture the war’s impact on import prices.
Across the Atlantic, the Eurozone’s outlook is decidedly more bleak. European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde told G7 officials last week that the economic effects of the war will be felt for far longer than the cessation of hostilities as “so much has already been destroyed.” Showing its more war-sensitive economic underpinnings to the war, Euro-area inflation jumped in March by the most since 2022, leading EU governments to slash their respective growth outlooks.
TRADE UPDATE
USTR marked the one-year anniversary of President Trump’s trade “Liberation Day” by highlighting a trade deficit reduction of 24%. According to USTR, the bilateral goods balance with trading partners has improved 61%. Reciprocal deals now cover half the world’s population.
Administration-sourced figures also show blue-collar wages recovering to pre-Biden levels. USTR also noted that the U.S. became the third-largest steel-producing nation in 2025, with over 4 million tons of new crude steelmaking capacity expected to come online in the next two years in West Virginia, Arkansas, and South Carolina.
Tariffs
Coinciding with the Liberation Day anniversary, the President announced a three-part tariff salvo affecting steel and aluminum, as well as pharmaceuticals. Specifically, the President’s April 2 proclamation strengthened Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, adding copper to the covered metals list for the first time, and restructured the tariff calculation from content-based to value-based. Under the new tiered regime, products in HTS Chapters 72 and 73 (raw steel and most derivatives) remain at 50% calculated on full product value; other steel and aluminum products fall to 25%. The shift is significant: an imported steel pipe now pays 50% on its entire value, not just its steel content.
The Administration simultaneously imposed a 100% tariff on patented pharmaceutical products and their ingredients under Section 232, effective in 120 days for large companies and 180 days for smaller ones (approximately early August and early October 2026). Most major drugmakers have already secured three-year reprieves via most-favored-nation pricing agreements. Companies without deals or active negotiations face the full levy; a 20% rate is available for four years to companies committing to move production to the U.S., reverting to 100% in 2030.
The tariff is the stick; the U.S.-U.K. Pharmaceutical Pricing Arrangement finalized the same day is the compliance template. USTR Ambassador Greer framed the U.K. deal as addressing “long-standing imbalances” in which U.S. patients have been “shouldering the burden of funding research and development for the next generation of life-saving medicines.”
Finally, there are two recent inputs that are worth highlighting and inform the Administration’s trade roadmap ahead. First, USTR released its 2026 National Trade Estimate (NTE), laying out barriers with each trading partner and providing a playbook towards unlocking stalled agreements. Adding to the document’s importance is its mere length, stretching 137 pages longer than last year’s.
Second, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provided the Court of International Trade (CIT) with a March 31 update on its refund system progress. The following shows the pace of the CBP’s metrics achieved since its March 19 report: Claim Portal (85% vs. 73%), Mass Processing (TBD vs. 45%), Review and Liquidation/Reliquidation (80% vs. 80%), and Refund (75% vs. 63%). The Mass Processing update reflects a Court-ordered revision to CBP’s refund parameters, requiring processing entries that are unliquidated or for which the 90-day voluntary reliquidation period hasn’t expired (over 60% of the IEEPA entries). CBP said it will eventually process finally liquidated entries.
China
President Xi Jinping last week demonstrated his focus on the Taiwan question ahead of his upcoming meeting with President Trump by inviting Taiwan’s KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun to Beijing for an April 7-12 visit. This would be the first trip by a KMT leader to China in nearly a decade. The timing, weeks before the Trump-Xi May 14-15 summit (and coinciding with a U.S. Senate delegation visit to Taiwan), is deliberate.
Cheng has sought to slash U.S.-demanded defense budget increases and advocated for closer ties with Beijing. The visit is a direct counterpoint to U.S. arms cooperation with Taiwan heading into the summit. Despite the KMT’s outreach, however, Taiwan continues to shore up its U.S. alliance, with the National Development Council announcing plans to launch a $250 billion credit guarantee program for companies investing in the U.S.
The WSJ separately reported that China is developing what could be its largest military base in the South China Sea at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands. Dredging began in October 2025 and the reclamation area now spans more than 15 square kilometers. Vietnam has formally protested as the base would add helipad capability, radar, and anchorage for warships within its proximate orbit. Regardless of the outcome of the Trump/Xi summit, Beijing will remain determined to expand its South China Sea footprint with an eye towards Taiwan.
On the U.S. side, Congress is pressuring the Administration ahead of the President’s Beijing visit. The House Select Committee on China released a new investigation last week documenting Chinese military and intelligence support for the global crude shadow fleet. Policy recommendations from the Committee included new port sanctions and empowering transshipment hub whistleblowers, while calling on the CFTC to launch a market manipulation investigation.
Congressional pressure also extends to a key negotiating issue on the Beijing summit agenda—AI export controls. Following the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s bipartisan markup of the Chip Security Act on March 26 (42-0), Senator Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and Andy Kim (D-NJ) introduced the MATCH Act on April 2. Rather than targeting chips directly, the MATCH Act would deter advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) like lithography from reaching Chinese firms. A companion bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Michael Baumgartner (R-WA).
The Administration’s AI export position on China, however, remains far more nuanced while simultaneously seeking global reliance on the U.S. tech stack. To that end, the Department of Commerce formally launched its American AI Exports Program last week, accepting company proposals through June 30 to deliver “full-stack American AI technology packages” to international partners, with government financial incentives for approved companies. The program is designed to deliver AI sovereignty on U.S. terms to countries that might otherwise turn to Chinese alternatives. The June 30 deadline means first approvals could land around or after the May 14-15 summit.
Thus, the existential variables for the U.S.-China relationship remain the same: Taiwan security and AI dominance. Ultimately, we expect nominal achievements out of the summit, with USTR Jamieson Greer telling Bloomberg last week that the main deliverable will be a new “U.S.-China Board of Trade,” which we previously highlighted as discussed at the Paris meetings. Greer does not expect any future principal-level meetings with Chinese counterparts prior to the trip.
Donroe Doctrine
The Trump Administration effectively waived its Cuba oil blockade—at least momentarily—as President Trump said he had “no problem” with Russia or any other country sending oil to Cuba. The sanctioned Russian tanker Anatoly Kolodkin arrived at the port of Matanzas on Monday carrying approximately 730,000 barrels, Cuba’s first oil delivery in more than three months. The Kremlin confirmed energy supplies were discussed with Washington ahead of the delivery, suggesting a coordinated carve-out rather than a unilateral Russian move.
The Administration’s move contradicts a Treasury waiver amendment issued earlier this month barring Russian oil deliveries to Cuba. Trump simultaneously predicted Cuba’s communist government would collapse “within a short period of time.” The oil import reprieve could be a sign of diplomatic progress between Secretary Rubio and the Cuban regime, though the Administration’s motivations are not yet known.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas formally resumed operations last Monday, ending a seven-year closure. The State Department described the move as “a key milestone in implementing the President’s three-phase plan for Venezuela.”
To be sure, acting President Delcy Rodríguez has cooperated with U.S. demands to date, reopening Venezuela’s oil sector to U.S. investment and ousting Maduro loyalists from the cabinet. Trump, speaking last week at a Cabinet meeting stated that “Venezuela is doing better right now than they’ve ever done in the history of their country — sort of like a joint venture, but the United States has made a lot of money.”
Early investors are now moving into Venezuela, with hedge funds, family offices, and distressed debt specialists positioning ahead of broader institutional participation. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves; the investment thesis is long-dated but the first-movers are arriving now.
USMCA
North of the border, Alberta separatists claimed to have gathered enough signatures—approximately 177,000—to force an October referendum on whether the province should remain in Canada. The petition threshold was previously a projection but is now a reported reality, though legal obstacles remain. An independent Alberta, while still an unlikely outcome according to public opinion polls, would not automatically be covered by USMCA. This would present a significant wrinkle in USMCA renegotiation talks as the province controls one of the world’s largest crude reserves.
Canada faces additional domestic contradictions. Ottawa is considering new import restrictions on frozen and canned vegetables and wood products after Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne ordered an investigation into trade diversion. Such a move would contradict Canada’s positioning as a rules-based trading partner and vocal WTO champion, risking further cost-of-living pressures that the Carney government has been fighting to contain.
The protectionist sentiment extends to Ontario where Premier Doug Ford recently said he was “dead against” Stellantis partnering with a Chinese EV company to make cars in Canada—a position at odds with Carney’s recent overtures to the CCP. U.S. Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra reiterated that Chinese EVs wouldn’t be allowed to cross from Canada into the U.S.
South of the border, the Mexican domestic security and labor environment continues to prove challenging with the opening World Cup match (June 1) and USMCA Joint Review period deadline (July 1) just months away. Following an armed attack on rubber factory workers, the United Auto Workers (UAW) is calling for an “immediate” action under the USMCA rapid response labor mechanism.
Miscellaneous
- Brazil. Reporting by Bloomberg last week suggests that President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party has lost substantial ground with Brazil’s young men and gig workers—ceding these potential voters to the right. This could mark a foreboding domestic political shift for Lula’s leftist government ahead of October’s presidential elections. The race between Lula and Flavio Bolsonaro is now a dead heat, providing a potential twofold opening for President Trump: improved ability to reach an elusive trade agreement with South America’s largest economy, while furthering a realignment of Latin American politics.
- European Union: Positive news last week, despite the war, included dialogue over long-simmering trade friction points including tech regulations and a steel-based alliance (along with the UK).
- India: Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal met with Ambassador Greer on the sidelines of the WTO Ministerial last week, to discuss next steps on the reciprocal trade framework and advancing it to the agreement phase (though no timeline has been announced).
- Panama: Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized China’s detention of Panamanian-flagged vessels in retaliation for its government ending the CK Hutchison Panama Canal port contract.
OUTLOOK/ANALYSIS
The Iran war’s single most consequential inflection point may be at hand just over 24 hours from now. The weight of evidence continues to tilt our analysis towards escalation. The economic case for a resolution, however, remains the counterbalance. WTI surpassing Brent is the market’s clearest signal yet that the conflict is being priced as longer and deeper than the original 4-to-6-week timeline. With retail gas above $4/gallon and diesel well above $5, the American consumer is growing restless—a significant electoral headwind for Republicans in an already fraught midterm election. The window for a tolerable economic outcome is closing fast.
The trade agenda is similarly unsettled in response to the war, as well as the IEEPA decision, pushing back frameworks from becoming agreements and creating uncertainty for replacement tariffs under Section 232 and Section 301. For now, the Administration remains undeterred by inflation and sector-specific tariff concerns. The upcoming Trump/Xi summit is unlikely to bring clarity to any of this and for now, companies must continue to weather the storm.
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